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Why Cryptocurrencies want Privacy:                                                            
A Review of Political Motivations and Branding Expressed in 
‘Privacy Coin’ Whitepapers 
ABSTRACT 
New currencies designed for user anonymity and privacy – widely referred to as ‘privacy coins’ 
- have forced governments to listen and legislate, but the political motivations of these 
currencies are not well understood. Following the growing interest of political brands in 
different contexts, we provide the first systematic review of political motivations expressed in 
cryptocurrency whitepapers whose explicit goal is ‘privacy’.  Many privacy coins deliberately 
position themselves as alternative political brands. Although cryptocurrencies are often closely 
associated with political philosophies that aim to diminish or subvert the power of governments 
and banks, advocates of privacy occupy much broader ideological ground.  We present 
thematic trends within the privacy coin literature and identify epistemic and ethical tensions 
present within the communities of people calling for the adoption of entirely private currencies.    
KEYWORDS Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, Blockchain, Privacy, Political brands, Money  
 
WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE! YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE 
BUT YOUR BLOCKCHAINS! 
Cryptocurrencies have their political roots in anarchist, hacker, hippy, and cypherpunk cultures 
(Maurer, Nelms and Swartz, 2013). Many designers, activists, and advocates of cryptocurrency 
want to dismantle the nation state and its associated corporations (Karlstrøm, 2014).  
Subversion of government and the removal of commercial influence over money is a 
widespread theme in cryptocurrency canonical literature (e.g. Nakamoto, 2008), but this trope 
is no longer universal.  Indeed, increasingly, those cryptocurrencies that succeed in creating 
value for their users are often explicitly branded and positioned to aid hegemonic political 
interests.   
Recent work on political branding highlights the diverse nature of political brands (Smith and 
French, 2009) and draws attention to the need to understand political branding in different 
contexts (Needham and Smith, 2015).  This paper contributes to the understanding of political 
branding by uncovering different types of motivation underpinning privacy coins.  We show 
how notions of politics emerge in cryptocurrencies which are explicitly positioned as political 
brands. 
Through the notion of privacy as politics, we submit that cryptocurrencies, though often 
branded and positioned as apolitical or anti-political (Herian, 2018), are always a form of 
‘alternative’ political movement. The desire to be a-political represents a political position itself 
(Kostakis and Giotitsas, 2014) and it is important to understand the political underpinnings 
behind the blockchain technology as it is driving social change (Filippi and Loveluck, 2016). 
The identification of political dimensions and ideologies in cryptocurrency challenges the idea 
that digital currency is removed from the influence of politicians (Dierksmeier and Seele 2016) 
and unveils a new context to research political branding. This is important because political 
ideology drives consumer decisions (Crockett and Pendarvis, 2017) and in the context of 
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cryptocurrency those decisions are likely to be significantly different if digital currencies are 
associated with particular political ideologies.  
In the following sections of this paper, we briefly review extant literature around 1) 
cryptocurrency and the recent emergence of ‘privacy coins’; 2) The relation of privacy to 
politics, including nuanced definitions of anonymity and privacy; and 3) the integration of 
cryptocurrencies, privacy and alternative political brands that will inform the subsequent 
discussion. Afterwards, we outline the methods used to generate a corpus of whitepapers and 
conduct a systematic review. In following section, we present an exposition of the findings and 
discussion.  Focus is directed toward emergent themes within the literature and ethical and 
epistemic conflicts present in the positioning of privacy cryptocurrencies. In the final section, 
we conclude the paper and put forward an agenda for future research to help broaden the 
academic study of privacy coins and their social impact. 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND THE POST-BITCOIN EMERGENCE OF 
‘PRIVACY COINS’ 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crash a pseudonymous author named Satoshi Nakamoto 
outlined a vision for an alternative monetary future using Bitcoin and the blockchain protocol 
(Nakamoto 2008). Nakamoto drew attention to the failings of modern banking institutions and 
sought to challenge their dominance by enabling decentralized peer-to-peer transactions. 
People, Nakamoto argued, should be free and able to control their personal wealth 
anonymously without relying on a centralized 3rd party (Dodd, 2017).  
Anonymity is a central issue for many Bitcoin users. No fixed identity is explicitly linked to a 
Bitcoin wallet address and ‘privacy’ is a key concern in Nakamoto’s initial Bitcoin whitepaper 
(Nakamoto, 2008). However, the idea that underpins Bitcoin (a public distributed ledger) raises 
some tricky challenges for maintaining user privacy. While it is easy to protect the identity of 
the owner of a Bitcoin wallet, it is harder to protect users from inferred conclusions about their 
identity that can be reached by analyzing wallet transfers. If Account A sends a specific amount 
at a specific time to Account B it is sometimes possible to triangulate and determine the offline 
identities of the people associated with the transaction. Indeed, in reviewing the privacy of 
Bitcoin, Nakamoto noted that:  
‘The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to 
the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions [in 
the Bitcoin protocol] publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by 
breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The 
public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information 
linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock 
exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the ‘tape’, is made public, but without 
telling who the parties were. As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each 
transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still 
unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were 
owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal 
other transactions that belonged to the same owner.’ (Nakamoto, 2008, 6) 
Various authors have shown that blockchain analysis can reveal connections between users and 
their transactions, and that further data can be inferred because of these connections which 
might jeopardize privacy (Ober, Katzensbeisser and Hamacher 2013, Reid and Harrigan 2013, 
Ron and Shamir 2013). Cookies have been shown to jeopardize the privacy of cryptocurrency 
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payments (Goldfeder et al. 2018) and similarly IP addresses have been associated with Bitcoin 
account use, which can provide a basis for identity inference (Bohannon 2016). Despite the 
clear value Nakamoto placed on ‘privacy’ the metadata that Bitcoin usage generates makes it 
a less than optimal solution for maintaining true privacy of users. Consequently, a wide variety 
of cryptocurrency designers and advocates have criticized the architecture of Bitcoin and 
proposed alternative overlays to the existing design or entirely new solutions (Meiklejohn and 
Orlandi 2015). These alternative cryptocurrencies typically try to hide or obfuscate user 
metadata and are thus widely referred to as ‘privacy coins’ (Nakamoto 2008).  
Privacy coins vary in technological sophistication, but they have gained widespread notoriety 
from their increasing use in nefarious transactions, particularly on the so-called ‘Dark-web’ 
(Recorded Future 2018).  Reports illustrate that privacy coins are being used by rogue states 
(Hurlburt 2017), drug dealers (Van Hout and Bingham 2013), illicit traders; and that they help 
hide sexual exploitation (Zulkarnine et al. 2016), terrorism, weapons trafficking (Weimann 
2016), and money laundering (Dostov and Shust 2014).  These activities have caught the eye 
of governments around the world. But governments are not simply interested in illicit behavior, 
some have legislated against, and even banned cryptocurrencies because absolute privacy of 
transactions threaten the possibility of audited ownership and taxation (Dierksmeier and Seele 
2016). ‘Know your customer’ regulations, which associate passport details with exchange 
users, are now widely adopted worldwide to surveil fiat-crypto conversions and provide the 
possibility of audit trails (Berentsen and Schar 2018).  
Despite the negative press cryptocurrencies receive they also present an opportunity to 
positively transform the economic lives of people.  Whether in banking the unbanked billions 
of people around the world (Larios-Hernández 2017), eliminating the fees imposed on 
remittances sent by the poorest workers in the world to their families (Scott 2016), or providing 
novel means for people to share, donate, or tip, many new cryptocurrencies have an obviously 
prosocial aim (Pittman 2016).  Indeed, many crypto initiatives clearly fall within the category 
of prosocial interaction design (Harvey et al., 2014), echoing the old Marxist adage that good 
philosophy aims not merely to describe or interpret the world, instead the point is to change it. 
The imagination, development, and adoption of a new currency is always a potentially 
transformative political act.  
Cryptocurrencies have been championed by advocates of a range of political philosophies. 
Nakamoto originally argued that Bitcoin was ‘very attractive to the libertarian viewpoint if we 
can explain it properly,’ but also added ‘I'm better with code than with words though’.  But as 
Maurer, Nelms and Swartz (2013, 262) note ‘in the world of Bitcoin, there are goldbugs, 
hippies, anarchists, cyberpunks, cryptographers, payment systems experts, currency activists, 
commodity traders, and the curious’  Although arguments made in favor of cryptocurrency are 
justifications for shrinking or eradicating the influence of government or banks over money, 
there are nonetheless at the time of writing numerous movements by national governments 
towards adopting cryptocurrency in place of or alongside fiat currency.  For example, the 
Marshall Islands have been heavily criticized by the International Monetary Fund over their 
plans to introduce a digital currency in 2019, and Venezuela have reportedly raised over 5 
billion USD in an initial coin offering in early 2018 (Petro 2018). This tension illustrates that 
cryptocurrency is no longer the preserve of those seeking to subvert the dominant monetary 
systems, it is also being co-opted by those national banks and governments it was created to 
counteract. We might ask the question then, what political purpose do privacy coins serve, and 




PRIVACY AS POLITICS 
Every society ‘sets a distinctive balance between the private sphere and public order based on 
the society’s political philosophy’ around two alternative societal models, namely 
Authoritarian (i.e. rejecting legally or socially protected privacy) and Democratic societies (i.e. 
having a strong commitment to individualism and freedom) (Westin 2003, 3). A long history 
of privacy research exists within the computing and politics academic literatures, respectively.  
Recent research draws attention to how metadata associated with ubiquitous forms of 
computing can inadvertently reveal identity or behavior of people without them giving 
informed consent (Luger and Rodden 2013). Although no single definition of privacy is 
accepted, the concept is obviously nuanced and has a meaning which cannot be universally 
understood outside of the particular contexts in which it is a concern (Smith, Dinev and Xu 
2011).  Privacy becomes a more ambiguous concept when human-computer interaction is 
enabled by data managed or processed centrally by commercial or governmental third parties. 
Privacy online is treated variously as either an inalienable right to which individuals and groups 
are entitled, or as a commodity best thought of as something which has an economic value that 
can be evaluated and traded as part of a cost-benefit analysis (Walsh, Parisi and Passerini 2017).  
In this paper we subscribe to Westin’s (1967, 7) classic definition of privacy as ‘the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others’. Westin’s (1967) account introduces 
subtlety into the understanding of privacy, by making a distinction between privacy ‘states’ 
and privacy ‘functions’. Four privacy states that individuals are said to experience can be 
paraphrased as: (1) Solitude: the most complete state of privacy, here the individual is separated 
from the group and the observations of other people; (2) Intimacy: here the individual is acting 
as part of a small group that can exercise corporate seclusion to achieve a close, relaxed or 
frank relationship between individuals; (3) Anonymity: here privacy relates to the individual 
that when in public spaces is able to find freedom from surveillance and identification; and (4) 
Reserve:  this occurs when an individual’s need to limit communication about their self is 
protected by the willing discretion of those surrounding them.    
Westin contrasted states of privacy with functions, suggesting that in democratic societies 
privacy can ‘perform’ different instrumental roles for individuals according to their own 
personal lives.  Functions are said to include: (1) Personal autonomy: the need to maintain 
social processes that safeguard a person’s sense of individuality and avoid being manipulated 
or dominated wholly by others; (2) Emotional release: the recognition that people ‘perform’ 
many different roles in their lives e.g. father, son, husband, friend, lover, colleague, boss, 
student, teacher, and that privacy affords at least temporary respite from these roles to relax 
from the pressure of playing social roles; (3) Self-Evaluation:  privacy serves not only a 
processing but a planning need by providing time to anticipate, to recast, and to originate. Every 
individual integrates their experiences into a meaningful pattern through self-evaluation and 
this activity requires privacy; and (4) Limited and Protected Communication: among mature 
adults all communication is partial and limited, based on the complementary relation between 
reserve and discretion.  
We also note that where money and surveillance technology are concerned what is private 
today may not be private tomorrow.  Consequently, privacy can be conceptualized either as a 
static, unchanging and universal value maintained by social rules or more pragmatically as 
something dynamic, which requires constant vigilance to revise and update protective measures 
according to changing socio-cultural and technological contexts. The relation between digital 
money and privacy has been an ongoing source of concern for computing academics for over 
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three decades.  In 1985, Chaum argued that new forms of transaction systems would work to 
ensure user privacy and make ‘Big Brother obsolete’. Okamoto and Ohta (1991) similarly 
suggested that any future Universal Electronic Cash would ideally ensure that ‘the privacy of 
the user should be protected. That is, the relationship between the user and his purchases must 
be untraceable by anyone’.  But in practice this is has proven a difficult challenge to implement.  
It requires a system that can guarantee the untraceability of money and the unlinkability of 
people to said money, but it also requires a system which can publicly record transactions to 
ensure decentralized trust, while also preventing the ‘double spend’ problem i.e. the risk of 
fraud through a currency being spent twice. 
The possibility of trust within Bitcoin and most other cryptocurrencies comes from a 
massively-distributed ledger that serves as an immutable historical record of transactions. 
Money, as Hart (2000) argues, always serves as a form of social memory.  Whether as a special-
purpose money used in a limited domain, or as a general-purpose money meant to operate 
across all spheres of human life, money functions as memory to establish ongoing social 
relations. Distributed memory is fundamental to the operation of Bitcoin.  But the immutable 
transaction history which enables trust between strangers is also a potential source of 
identifying the behavior of individual accounts, even when identity is pseudonymized.  This 
raises not just a technical problem, but also political one: given that monetary transactions and 
the externalities which are associated with trade affect people beyond those transacting, should 
money ever be entirely private to the two individuals that transact? One criticism of Bitcoin 
raised by Dodd (2018) is that many advocates frame the political economy of the 
cryptocurrency as if it exists as a ‘thing’ outside of human control, a natural, or in other words, 
non-social process.  
‘If Bitcoin succeeds in its own terms as an ideology, it will fail in practical terms as a form of 
money. The main reason for this is that the new currency is premised on the idea of money as 
a ‘thing’ that must be abstracted from social life in order for it to be protected from 
manipulation by bank intermediaries and political authorities. The image is of a fully 
mechanized currency that operates over and above social life. In practice, however, the 
currency has generated a thriving community around its political ideals, relies on a high 
degree of social organization in order to be produced, has a discernible social structure, and 
is characterized by asymmetries of wealth and power that are not dissimilar from the 
mainstream financial system.’ (Dodd, 2018). 
Economic transactions and the money that accompany them do not exist in a void free of social 
consequences, and as Seele (2018) notes, ‘let us not forget: crypto means secret’.  Secrecy and 
currency are not common bedfellows, and the social implications of secret transactions echo 
far beyond the dyad of sender and recipient.  If humanity widely adopts privacy coins for the 
practical purposes of paying wages and buying goods and services, the political ramifications 
will be gargantuan for existing social institutions. Considering the neglect of privacy issues in 
branding (Ohm, 2012) and the political underpinnings of privacy (Westin, 2003), now is an 
opportune moment to assess how privacy coin designers conceptualize, justify and implement 







CRYPTOCURRENCIES, PRIVACY AND POLITICAL BRANDS 
A minimal definition of political branding is ‘political representations that are located in a 
pattern, which can be identified and differentiated from other political representations’ 
(Nielsen, 2013).  According to Nielsen, ‘identification’ and ‘differentiation’ are the two simple 
attributes that need to be emphasized in the definition of political brands (Nielsen, 2016; 71; 
Nielsen, 2017; 126), meaning the concept can be applied widely to numerous research objects.  
Although most political branding research to date has focused on policies, parties and 
politicians (Speed, Butler and Collins, 2015), recent studies suggest the importance of 
exploring how political brands are positioned in different contexts and settings (Needham and 
Smith, 2015). Among new contexts of inquiry researchers have investigated ‘nations, parties, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), interest organizations, leaders, candidates, policies, 
communication, or rhetoric’ (Nielsen, 2017; 120) and the symbolism in the construction of 
selected Islamist audio-visual propaganda made available on the internet (O’Shaughnessy and 
Baines 2009). These approaches illustrate the diverse nature of political brands as a concept 
(Smith and French, 2009) researched from multiple perspectives (Nielsen, 2016). The need to 
understand alternative political brands becomes more relevant in a climate where political 
parties show an image of crisis and the traditional dominant modes of political organization are 
being challenged (Husted et al., 2018). 
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are designed to eradicate the influence of politicians and 
bankers over the productive control of money, such that top-down coercion is removed from 
the system.  Political and commercial institutions are thus to be avoided by design, and their 
influence is therefore reduced (Dierksmeier and Seele, 2016). Although government influence 
on cryptocurrencies is limited, some authors suggest that many advocates of Bitcoin use it for 
political reasons (Ron and Shamir, 2015), while others suggest that the blockchain system 
(underpinned by a ‘neoliberal political economy’ that enables cryptocurrency transactions) is 
trying to hide the politics involved (Herian, 2018).  The politics of cryptocurrencies are made 
visible where designers identify and differentiate varied approaches to privacy.  In the 
following section, we outline a method for studying cryptocurrencies through the descriptions 





Research method  
We conducted a systematic review of cryptocurrency white papers using a method inspired by 
the PRISMA protocol (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis) 
(Shamseer et al. 2015), a ‘well-respected evidence-based approach from medical science’ 
recently used in management research (Kranzbühler et al. 2018, 434). Review protocols are 
used to help protect against arbitrary decision making during the review, and also to enable the 
reader to assess the presence of selective reporting, by documenting a clear and replicable 
process. Though systematic reviews have been used before in the area of political branding 
(Nielsen, 2017) they are a relatively novel approach within the field.  An overview of the 




Figure 1: Systematic review method for generating a corpus of privacy coin whitepapers 
 
 
Identification. First, an initial corpus of cryptocurrency whitepapers was selected by using the 
market cap tracking website coinmarketcap.com. This service follows the live price 
fluctuations of cryptocurrency exchanges and publish the details on their websites. Aggregated 
statistics are used to rank the total volume and market value of each currency/token such that 
potential investors can broadly analyze the market. It is important to note that it is practically 
impossible to review all privacy coin whitepapers, due to the enormous growth in coins which 
have created hardforks of existing privacy coins.  Many of these coins are referred to as 
‘altcoins’ and others more disparagingly as ‘shitcoins’ due to their low market capitalization, 
lack of innovation and user engagement. On the day the corpus of whitepapers was generated 
1981 coins/tokens were listed on coinmarketcap.com with a known total market capitalization 
of $193,560,063,184. We observed that 98% of the USD value of this market was shared 
between the top 333 coins and we decided to focus on those coins as the limit of our corpus 
because they are demonstrably successful compared with the innumerable copycats. Those 
included have persuaded the imagination, and perhaps more importantly the wallets, of users 
across the globe.  
Screening. Using these ranked lists the top 333 cryptocurrencies (as of 11/09/2018) were 
identified and the associated whitepaper of each coin/token was specifically analyzed for the 
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presence of ‘privacy’ claims where the designers sought to create a financial instrument that 
masks user behavior and metadata which could be inferred to reveal identity.  
Whitepapers occupy an unusual genre of writing, straddling technical report and manifesto 
simultaneously. Most papers describe their innovation, but also aim to persuade the audience 
to use the currency as a solution to particular political economy problems. Though many are 
written by practicing cryptographers and economists, most are styled in a pseudo-academic 
fashion to ensure rigor and accessibility. They are thus as much a stylistic heir to the tradition 
of pamphleteering as to academic journals. To our knowledge most of the whitepapers selected 
in the corpus were not subjected to the traditional academic double-blind peer review process, 
other than a few notable exceptions (e.g. Zerocoin and Zerocash). But those currencies that 
receive popular attention do nonetheless receive whitepaper scrutiny and discussion by users 
and investors on public Web forums such as Bitcointalk, Reddit, and Telegram. 
Eligibility. After the corpus was assembled the research team read the abstracts and/or 
introductions of each paper to look for claims of privacy.  If an abstract used privacy or an 
obvious synonym for obfuscation (e.g. ‘anonymous’, ‘pseudonymous’, ‘cloaking’, ‘hiding’, 
‘obscuring’, ‘dark’) the full paper was included in the corpus.  The papers were then assessed 
for full eligibility by examining the design described in each paper for evidence of 
technological innovation explicitly regarding privacy.  Those papers that described privacy as 
an aim but did not describe a particular privacy innovation were excluded at this stage.  
Included. The inclusion criteria used to assess whitepaper suitability for the corpus were 
twofold.  To be included in the corpus a coin/ or token must: 1) advertise its purpose as 
defending and/or improving privacy of its users; and 2) Develop technology to create 
untraceability or unlinkability in the specific domain in which the currency is used. As a result 
of this stage, we removed ten white papers that did not meet these criteria and we obtained a 
sample of 40 white papers (over 1000 pages of text) for scrutiny. 
Data analysis 
After completing the stages of identification, screening, eligibility and inclusion, we focused 
on data analysis. Drawing on Westin’s (1967) definition of privacy around the states (i.e. 
solitude, intimacy, anonymity, reserve) and functions of privacy (i.e. personal autonomy, 
emotional release, self-evaluation and limited and protected communication), we developed a 
series of questions to ask of each paper to compare the practical, political and technical aspects 
of privacy described by each whitepaper. The questions included: 1) is privacy described as an 
end in itself or is privacy instrumental to some other moral aim? (e.g. happiness, safety); (2) is 
privacy described as a right or a commodity?; (3) what technologies are deployed to protect 
privacy?; (4) what states of privacy if any are said to be protected by the technology?; (5) What 
function of privacy is served by the technology?; (6) Is there an obvious allegiance to a political 
philosophy?; (7) Does the solution propose a general or special purpose money?; (8) Is privacy 
seen as a static or one-off solution to a problem or is it a dynamic/processual phenomenon 
worthy of ongoing consideration and revisionist development?  
The selected white papers were scrutinized in two ways. First, we used the aforementioned 
questions to analyze each whitepaper and use a priori coding to generate preliminary answers 
in a spreadsheet (See Table 1).  The results were then used to guide the identification of 
emergent themes in relation to the broader privacy as politics literature. Second, we carefully 
examined the selected white papers to gather in-depth inductive insights into the political 
motivations expressed in the whitepaper authors’ own terms. These results provided the basis 
for examining the corpus across (1) privacy as politics themes within the whitepapers, which 
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indicated convergent/divergent motivations for developing and fostering privacy; (2) identify 
tensions in the way privacy is framed epistemically and ethically in relation to politics; and (3) 
develop an agenda for future research based on issues that emerged from the analysis that 
indicate worthiness of further inquiry.  
PRIVACY COINS AS POLITICAL BRANDS 
Following the questions outlined in the data analysis section, we identified a number of political 
themes around privacy. These are shown explicitly for the cryptocurrency whitepapers 
examined in Table 1.  The table shows that allegiance to distinct political ideologies is present 
in many of the whitepapers and can be seen in the championing of ideals such as ‘Economic 
Liberalism’ (DigitalNote, 2018), ‘Libertarianism’ (e.g. Horizen,-Viglione et al., 2017; 
CloakCoin, 2018) ‘Egalitarian’ (Bytecoin - Van Saberhagen, 2013), ‘Democracy’ (e.g. Aion 
– Spoke, 2017; Stakenet, 2018), ‘Sovereignty’ (Mainframe - Clarke et al. 2018), 
‘Empowerment’ (Pura, 2018) and ‘Revolution’ (Aeon, 2014).   
Despite the variety of political positions expressed, privacy coin whitepapers are almost always 
ambitious too, as the vast majority aim to become a general purpose money rather than special 
purpose within a limited domain. Privacy is overwhelmingly seen as an end in itself, but there 
is some variation in the corpus over whether privacy should be seen as a right or commodity, 
and whether privacy requires a static or dynamic evaluation.  Though the political justifications 
for privacy coins are varied, the state of privacy which privacy coins aim to protect according 
to Westin’s definitions is, almost always, anonymity.  Indeed a keyword search across all 
documents reveals that 31 of the 40 white papers included even use the same terminology 
explicitly as ‘anonymous’ or ‘anonymity’ in order to justify their existence.  
Cryptocurrency designers have a wide range of political beliefs, but perhaps the common 
feature mentioned in the majority of whitepapers are variants of freedom.  Freedom, however 
is a multi-faceted concept, and one can find references to freedom from governments, freedom 
from banks, freedom from multi-national companies, freedom from financial enslavement, 
freedom from exploitative charges, and freedom from surveillance. These claims for freedom 
are spread with inconsistent application throughout the corpus and depend largely on the 
domain specific aims of the designers.   
Though the functions of privacy described in the whitepapers are primarily to protect 
communication and personal autonomy we find reasons that go beyond Westin’s (1967) 
categories.  The politics of ‘privacy’ claims are, generally speaking, less explicit than the 
broader and more common political aim of seizing the productive capacity of money from 
existing institutions.  That said, there are a number of obvious convergent themes within 
privacy coin whitepapers that identify shared motivations for a range of societal stakeholders. 
Different motivations for privacy emerged from our review of cryptocurrency white papers. 
Although existing research indicates the need for brands to think about ways to protect and 
compete on privacy, scholars have neglected this approach (Ohm, 2012), which is salient when 
approaching cryptocurrencies as political brands as their motivations manifest in different 
ways.  We now discuss each of them in turn:   
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Table 1: Privacy coins and associated whitepapers included within the corpus for further analysis 


















States of privacy 
protected 
Function of Privacy Allegiance to 
Political 
Philosophy? 
Monero (Noether 2018 - though 
multiple papers written) 
 
10th $1,773,363,977 General End Right Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Protect users in a court of law No 
Dash (Duffield and Diaz 2018) 11th $1,652,700,450 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Zcash (Sasson et al. 2014) 21st $561,792,867 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Bytecoin (Van Saberhagen 2013) 24th $375,452,075 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Egalitarian 
Verge (Verge  2018) 41st $195,109,417 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
Basic Attention Token (Basic 
Attention Token 2018) 
 
46th $155,687,403 Special End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
Komodo ( Komodo 2018) 53rd $116,249,238 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes -Anonymity, 
Reserve 
To protect freedom Libertarian 
Cryptonex (Cryptonex 2017) 54th $113,665,784 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Wanchain (Wanchain 2017) 62nd $93,891,052 Special End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Aion (Spoke and Nuco Engineering 
Team 2017) 
64th $90,866,325 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Bitcoin Dark (Lee 2014) 72nd $78,689,089 General End Commodity Static Yes - Reserve Protected communication No 
Horizen (Viglione et al. 2017) 76th $72,210,878 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
Ark (Ark 2018) 82nd $65,281,755 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Bitcoin Private (Brutman et al. 
2018) 
87th $61,856,082 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
ZCoin (Miers et al.2018) 92nd $57,576,857 General End Commodity Static Not Explicit Protected communication No 
PIVX (Pivx 2018) 97th $53,540,561 General End Right Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
Enigma (Zyskind et al. 2018) 108th $43,749,692 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Aurora (Aurora Labs 2018) 112th $41,548,918 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
Civic (Civic Technologies 2017) 119th $37,923,916 General End Commodity Static Not explicit Protected communication No 
Skycoin (Skycoin 2017) 131st $32,744,135 General Means Commodity Dynamic Yes Anonymity Protected communication No 
Storj (Wilkinson et al. 2016) 133rd $32,500,268 General End Commodity Static Yes - Reserve Protected communication No 





Digital Note (Digital Note 2018) 194th $20,677,499 General End Commodity Static Yes- Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
ZClassic (Creighton 2018) 196th $20,061,237 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes-Anonymity Protected communication Democracy 





233rd $15,927,975 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication 
Business protection 
No 
Pura (Pura 2018) 242th $14,907,661 General Means Right Static Not explicit Protected communication Democracy 
Mainframe (Clarke et al., 2018) 247th $14,647,533 Special End Right Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication 
Compliance 
Sovereignty 
IOTeX (IoTex Team 2018) 248th $14,488,970 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes- Anonymity Protected communication 
Safe acquisition 
No 
ION (Matlack et al. 2016) 255th $14,111,834 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication 
Consumer protection 
No 
NavCoin (Navcoin 2018) 257th $13,959,244 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Protected communication 
Business Protection 
Democracy 
CPChain (CPChain Team 2018) 266th $12,864,672 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Personal autonomy, Safe acquisition No 
TokenPay (Capo el al. 2017) 269th $12,723,732 General End Commodity Static Yes-Anonymity Protected communication 
Business Protection 
No 
PACcoin (Pac coin 2018) 276th $12,012,093 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Protected communication No 
Aeon (Aeon 2014) 284th $11,528,314 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Not explicit Join the 
revolution 
Stakenet (Stakenet 2018) 285th $11,484,925 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Personal autonomy, Safe transaction No 
Bulwark (Bulwark 2018) 310th $9,970,454 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Personal autonomy Libertarian 
BitNewChain (Bitnew-Chain 2018) 318th $9,761,978 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Protected comms/trans. 
Consumer protection 
No 
CloakCoin (Cloakcoin 2018) 320th $9,671,115 General End Commodity Dynamic Yes - Anonymity Protected communication Libertarian 
WABnetwork (Wab 2018) 331st $9,089,798 General End Commodity Static Yes - Anonymity Safe transactions No 
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Privacy as a guarantor of fungibility  
‘Fungibility is an attribute of money that dictates that all units of a currency should remain 
equal. When you receive money within a currency, it should not come with any history from 
the previous users of the currency or the users should have an easy way to disassociate 
themselves from that history, thus keeping all coins equal. At the same time, any user should 
be able to act as an auditor to guarantee the financial integrity of the public ledger without 
compromising others privacy.’ (Dash, 2018) 
 
‘Fungibility is a core component of money, it requires that all the pieces of a currency remain 
equal. For example, when you get coins via Private$PAC, these coins should not have any 
fingerprints from their previous transactions or users.’ (PAC, 2018) 
 
Money is used for all sorts of purposes, some of which are deemed illegitimate or criminal by 
governments. As money passes between people it can become tainted by the actions of previous 
owners, for example through illicit transactions involving drugs, weapons, stolen goods, money 
laundering, or perhaps more worryingly as a consequence of the subjective whims of a 
dictatorial regime.  'Dirty' money is therefore potentially at risk of being expropriated or seized 
by the state. By obfuscating the history of coin transactions some privacy coins (e.g. Dash - 
Duffield and Diaz, 2018; PAC Coin, 2018; Komodo, 2018; Stakenet, 2018) pursue the goal of 
a truly fungible money, wherein all coins are equally valued regardless of their historical 
trajectories and associated owners. In this respect, privacy coins try to attain the quality of 
fungibility already possessed by offline cash in the form of physical coins and banknotes.  A 
further consequence of expropriated money is price instability for the rest of the market.  As 
expropriation may become increasingly commonplace as governments resist the integration of 
cryptocurrency into wider society, designers have recognized that these instances do not 
happen in isolation from the rest of the financial system, and that fungibility can help to support 
financial resilience for the broader currency implementation.  
Privacy as personal security 
 ‘To protect their privacy, users thus need an instant, risk-free, and, most importantly, 
automatic guarantee that data revealing their spending habits and account balances is not 
publicly accessible by their neighbors, co-workers, and merchants.’ (Zerocash - Ben-Sasson et 
al, 2014) 
If a malicious agent doesn’t know how much money you own, it becomes harder to target 
potential victims.  Privacy thus provides a safeguard through hiding resources. But the broader 
claims made by coins like Zerocash (2014), Particl (2017), and CPChain (2018) is that personal 
security is also the responsibility of the network.  This is particularly a problem when 
consumers are not in a position to be sufficiently aware of potential privacy leaks or threats 
and thus are unable to provide informed consent.   Personal security then is not just a matter of 
individuals ensuring they have the resources to defend and protect themselves, it is a much 
broader claim about the incomplete knowledge users possess and a political motivation to 
ensure maintenance of fiscal standards regardless.   This judgment about user knowledge is not 
just a claim about the present moment, it is also extended into the future in recognition that all 
people are in a process of developmental learning, as can be seen in the quote below:   
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Many of humanity’s most meaningful advancements in art, technology, and other human 
endeavors began in situations where the creator had the security of privacy in which to explore, 
to discover, to make mistakes, and to learn thereby. (Komodo, 2018) 
Although issues relating to Westin’s privacy state of reserve are only rarely discussed in the 
white papers, there is nonetheless evidence that some designers see privacy as a safeguard for 
ensuring the future personal growth of their users.   This is a more sophisticated account of 
privacy than a static understanding permits, instead recognising that the acquiescence of others 
is a necessary precondition for the maturation of any person, and as such should be defended.    
 
Privacy as consumer protection   
 ‘Consumers expect a certain level of convenience when it comes to transferring value in 
exchange for goods and services, and this is why payment processing on the web has become 
commonplace. Along with this expectation of convenience, there is an assumed level of privacy 
that comes with such a transaction. Unfortunately, over the past two decades there have been 
entities who profit off of creating an online ‘profile’ of a consumer by tracking online credit 
card transactions. This is incredibly invasive and serves as a large supporting premise for why 
a consumer would want to transact online with cryptocurrency.’ (Bitcoin Private, 2018). 
Commercial intrusion into consumers’ lives is widely cited in the privacy coin literature as 
something to be resisted, for example: 
‘The online services we use are increasingly demanding more of our personal data, a 
disturbing trend that threatens the privacy of users on a global scale. Entities such as Google, 
Facebook and Yahoo have grown into colossal, seemingly unaccountable corporations by 
monetizing their users’ personal data’ (Particl 2018). 
Multiple privacy coins (e.g. Aurora, 2018; Bitcoin Private, 2018; Particl, 2018; TokenPay – 
Capo et al, 2017; Enigma – Zyskind et al, 2018) explicitly comment on the use of privacy 
measures to protect consumers now and in imagined future scenarios.  These arguments rely 
heavily on protecting the privacy state of anonymity (i.e. freedom from surveillance in public 
places) and the function of protected communications. For instance, if an account balance and 
behavior is unknown it is impossible to serve targeted advertisements based on behavioral 
segmentation.  Behavioral advertising is now the norm across the Web, but it hinges on 
measuring, monitoring and updating a record of identity. Similarly, if an account balance is 
closely followed by companies it becomes possible to use that information for dynamic or 
differential pricing i.e. charging you more because of who are or based on the increased 
likelihood that you will pay more at particular moments. This thread in the privacy literature is 
thus an attempt to develop consumer sovereignty in the marketplace.  
 
Privacy as business protection 
‘Meet Randal. As an entrepreneur, he is very aware of the importance of protecting the 
identities and finances of his clients safe. This is especially true as he provides anonymous 
genetic screening for diseases such as Parkinson’s disease and Dementia. A breach of client 
data could ruin the lives of his clients, not only his business. After realizing that typical 
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financial solutions provided no actual guarantee that leaks and breaches would not affect his 
business or his client, he began to use Verge to transact business’ (Verge 2018). 
Privacy aims are widely extended to focus on businesses in many of the whitepapers in the 
corpus (e.g. BitNew Chain, 2018; CPChain, 2018; Verge, 2018; Skycoin, 2017; Ark, 2018; 
Bitcoin Dark – Lee, 2014; Wanchain, 2017; Iotex Team, 2018).  Concealed transactions can 
help mask the relations between buyer and seller. Transactions up and downstream in supply 
chains can therefore be concealed from prying eyes. This is particularly important where a 
breach of privacy may jeopardize the lives of vulnerable clients, but it is also a means of 
maintaining competitive advantage.  3rd party financial intermediaries such as banks and credit 
providers have unprecedented access to transaction information of businesses across the globe.  
Although many consumers are increasingly vigilant with their privacy in the post-Snowden 
world we now inhabit, there is perhaps far less scrutiny given to the surveillance of corporate 
entities who are often seen as those adversaries being fought against.  Organizations are 
especially vulnerable to privacy invasion. The obfuscation of supply chain relations is a 
defensive mechanism against competitors, but it is also potentially a means to deliberately hide 
information from consumers who may boycott a product when an organization fails to deliver 
on supply chain moral expectations.  
 
Privacy as safe acquisition/transaction 
The majority of discussion around privacy in relation to cryptocurrencies focuses on 
maintaining privacy before, during and after currency has been spent.  But the acquisition 
process is similarly important for maintaining user privacy.  The way that people acquire 
cryptocurrencies varies widely depending on their circumstance.  Some people earn currencies 
as networks reward miners or ‘masternodes’ for validating transactions, while others directly 
exchange their fiat money for cryptocurrencies on 3rd party websites, and some are also the 
beneficiaries of direct payments, gifts, donations or anonymous tips.  In each of these use cases 
people acquire cryptocurrencies through different means and each carry their own respective 
privacy risks. A range of whitepapers (e.g. CPCChain, 2018; Bulwark, 2018; Verge, 2018; 
Basic Attention Token, 2018; Komodo, 2018; Digital Note, 2018) draw attention to 
maintaining privacy during acquisition and transactions for a variety of reasons.  For example, 
as discussed earlier, if a user is linked to a wallet address or ID then it becomes potentially 
fruitful for attackers to direct unwanted attention at that same address for malicious reasons. 
During the mining process for instance, miners can group together and censor transactions by 
actively not adding transactions to the proposed block.  As more people become involved in 
hosting nodes for remuneration within these networks privacy may evolve to become more 
focused on guaranteed earnings than maintaining discretion when spending.  If cryptocurrency 
is ever to become widely used for paying wages it is likely that privacy measures that manage 
coin acquisition would also need to be widely adopted.  
 
Privacy as compliance 
‘The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) passed by the EU in 2016 requires 
enterprise IT practices to comply with strict privacy measures. Granting IT Admins a platform 
focused on user sovereignty, corporations can design streamlined systems without the risk of 
leaking information in transit. Liability is reduced when sensitive data is isolated within a 
secure system’ (Clarke et al. 2018, Mainframe). 
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The media commentary around privacy coins has almost invariably drawn attention to what 
society loses when financial transactions become hidden.  But this position loses sight of the 
already well-established legal frameworks surrounding interpersonal computing.  A range of 
privacy coin whitepapers also draw attention to the need to act in accordance with preexisting 
standards and comply where necessary (Sasson et al., 2014; Zerocoin –Miers et al., 2018; 
TokenPay – Capo et al, 2017; Mainframe - Clarke et al. 2018).  Privacy as compliance is likely 
to become increasingly important for those limited-domain projects which utilize blockchain, 
cryptocurrencies or tokens as a special-purpose money which can inadvertently reveal metadata 
about their users.  Here privacy is less to do with a crusading moral purpose.  Instead, it is de 
jure privacy, an adherence to a state of affairs in accordance with the law.  
 
EPISTEMIC AND ETHICAL TENSIONS IN THE POLITICS OF 
PRIVACY COINS 
Three clear political tensions emerged from the inductive analysis, these relate to: 1) an 
inherent conflict of political ideologies in maintaining privacy, 2) disagreement in the practical 
implementation of privacy, and 3) the ethics implications of conflicting privacy 
conceptualizations due to technical limitations in design.  
Tension one: ‘We the people’ without the ‘We’  
‘I don’t believe we shall ever have a good money again before we take the thing out of the 
hands of government. That is, we can’t take it violently out of the hands of government. All we 
can do is by some sly roundabout way introduce something they can’t stop.’ (Hayek quoted in 
Ammous (2018)). 
Nakamoto recognized Bitcoin’s sensibility to libertarian political philosophy and this remains 
a clear thread running through many privacy coins.  The relation to libertarian ideas is clearest 
when privacy coin whitepaper authors cite the work of ‘Austrian School’ economists such as 
Friedrich Hayek.  Indeed, in the prophetic statement shown above, Hayek recognized the 
practical issue of creating an ideal currency well before the advent of cryptocurrency or even 
the Internet.  A good money in the eyes of this philosophy is a money not controlled by any 
one individual, and yet even if the money is not violently created, it nonetheless requires at 
worst coercion or at best a gentler form of persuasion.  This echoes the work of Dodd (2017) 
cited earlier that draws attention to the implicit social structure involved in maintaining a 
trustless, decentralized currency. A typical argument made in favor of privacy coins can be 
seen below: 
‘I care about more than cryptocurrencies. In fact they are a means to an end, the end being 
political empowerment of individuals... Our goal is to create a backdrop that allows pioneers 
to forge a method of societal organization that politically empowers individuals to become 
their own bank and, eventually, their own government.’ (Pura 2018).  
Empowerment is a central theme in the literature, but this creates a tension when the political 
goal is also privacy.  Pura (2018) cited above also discuss an aim to improve the ‘common 
good’ through enabling individuals rather than allowing central authorities to make decisions 
about intervening through capital projects. One evident tension here though is that without the 
knowledge of how money flows between different actors it is difficult to properly understand 
financial inequity through empirical means. Many of the rights granted to marginalized groups 
over the past hundred years were only guaranteed by a state after collective efforts drew 
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attention and scrutiny to the mistreatment or corrosive power relations than exist between 
individuals.   If all transactions between individuals become private, then it becomes impossible 
to trace the flows of capital and the associated structures of domination that potentially 
disempower marginalized groups.   
Tension two: decisional privacy vs universal privacy 
‘The superior privacy layer that NIX offers solves many concerns in the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem. Because NIX believes that users should have the power of privacy, it is not a 
required feature, simply an optional one.’ (NIX 2018). 
How should privacy be practically embedded in privacy coins? All transactions by their nature 
include two parties.  If both parties wish to reveal their interaction to other people should they 
be allowed to do so if they don’t jeopardize the privacy of others? Some currencies are designed 
with modular privacy features that enable users to reveal details publicly when acting (e.g. 
NIX, Zcash).  This has been criticized by privacy universalists such as Monero, who argue that 
the revelation of details by one user threatens the broader integrity of privacy for the rest of the 
network (sometimes called networked privacy – Boyd, 2012).   The cherry-picked approach to 
privacy, is referred to as decisional privacy, and is criticized because it is seen as impinging on 
the rights of 3rd parties.  
Decisional privacy is a well-established concept within the literature (e.g. Wacks 2015) and in 
this instance it refers to the right of an individual to choose what information is revealed during 
an interaction.  The consequence of privacy coins that wish to facilitate decisional privacy is 
that the currencies will thus become special-purpose monies of limited domain, rather than a 
generally acceptable protocol, regardless of the privacy interest being defended.   The likely 
outcome of this tension is that decisional and universal privacy coins are likely to coexist in 
the future and consequently eat the market share of each other, potentially precluding the 
positive network effects that could emerge if users privileged one design over the other.  
Tension three: unlinkability or taint resistance? 
Should designers aim to make technology which can make transactions unintelligible or 
invisible? This is the technical challenge, which privacy coin designers face and attempt to 
provide a solution to.  Complete invisibility may be technically impossible as new technology 
continues to emerge and make robust protections become obsolete. This has important 
implications for user literacy too.  If a user adopts a currency they are often confronted with a 
whitepaper or marketing material which promises anonymity, but this anonymity could come 
from invisibility of transactions or a technical intervention which makes behavioral traces 
become unintelligible. Both positions are seldom articulated as being distinct within the white 
paper corpus.  Yet the anonymity claimed by so many privacy coins has been criticized as a 
kind of pseudonymity by many technical papers, and this is not well-reflected in whitepapers. 
Meiklejohn and Orlandi (2015) introduce the sophisticated notion of taint resistance when 
analyzing the claims made by privacy overlays.  Existing notions of unlinkability for electronic 
cash require that a valid coin belonging to one user is indistinguishable from a valid coin 
belonging to another.  
‘In Bitcoin, it is impossible to satisfy this definition: a bitcoin essentially is its spending history, 
and it is thus trivial to distinguish two valid bitcoins. Any notion of anonymity that is useful for 
Bitcoin must therefore focus less on the coins themselves and more on ownership.’  
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Specifically, the concept ‘attempts to capture how well an adversary can discern the ownership 
of a bitcoin based on its previous spending history. Our definition has the advantage that we 
can not only provide proofs of security (i.e., prove that a protocol achieves optimal taint 
resistance), but that it also provides a concrete measurement of the degree to which a proposed 
solution is effective in improving anonymity.’ Though many of the coins make outlandish 
claims about the quality of privacy protection, and some speak as though their solution to 
privacy is static, there is nonetheless recognition within other papers that privacy requires 
vigilance.  Taint resistance is clearly a different ethical standpoint on privacy to unlinkability 
(regardless of its potential future design possibility).  The notion neatly captures the frailty of 
many existing uses of privacy when used in whitepapers to attract a broad audience. Expressing 
this ethic clearly is perhaps the single most important step to ensuring the possibility of 
informed consent.  The failure to seek such consent will invariably lead to differences in 
understanding emerging between designers and users.  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Several issues became apparent when conducting the literature review, which warrant further 
attention.  Though we can be confident in our assertions about designers’ intentions of privacy 
coins, we can be less sure about the motivations that are associated with user adoption.  Most 
privacy coins treat privacy as an end in itself, which therefore means users may adopt the coins 
according to shared, different or even conflicting ultimate motivations.  We suggest that further 
empirical scrutiny should be given to the following research questions:  
(1) Who is using privacy coins? Is this the domain of a truly decentralized and egalitarian social 
project or does cryptocurrency, with its arsenal of jargon and technical barriers, actually 
preclude adoption from those marginalized or disenfranchised people who would benefit most 
from privacy features?  
(2) Why do people use privacy coins? Scaremongering abounds in the media portrayal of 
privacy coins and yet this is often based on unsubstantiated claims about the actual use of the 
currencies.  Though this is a tricky environment to conduct research in given that privacy coin 
users obviously want privacy, there is nonetheless a burgeoning community of users in online 
forums (e.g. Reddit, Bitcointalk, and Telegram) who have willingly expressed their views in 
public and on record.  There are literally hundreds of thousands of people involved in these 
communities and many of them may be willing to disclose their views in person or in large-
scale questionnaires.  
(3) How does the relative prevalence of privacy coin adoption vary in relation to the broader 
political landscapes that people inhabit? Cryptocurrencies are a potentially subversive force for 
the existing monetary system in democratic countries, but they are potentially an emancipatory 
force for people living under the shadow of totalitarian regimes.  Greater empirical scrutiny on 
the country-specific adoption rates of privacy coins would help to theorize the dynamics 
involved in their uptake as well as their revolutionary potential.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the understanding of political branding by shedding light on how 
notions of politics emerge in privacy coins and uncovering different ways in which 
cryptocurrencies underpin political brands. The identification of political dimensions and 
ideologies in cryptocurrency challenges the idea that digital currency is removed from the 
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influence of politicians (Dierksmeier and Seele 2016) and unveils a new context to research 
political branding.  
Privacy often seems to be a secondary consideration in the world of cryptocurrency.  Indeed, 
though Nakamoto paid lip service to the value of privacy their initial political aims seem more 
concerned with building a decentralized and resilient system that seizes the production of 
money from the state rather than guaranteeing the privacy of every individual user. As a 
consequence, the design of other cryptocurrencies since have largely echoed the ordering of 
these political points, the former being more urgent than the latter.  One can readily find 
evidence of this in the claims made by cryptocurrency evangelists online that preventing 
governments from printing money will prevent war, genocide, poverty or other catastrophic 
events that blight human lives.    
Privacy, though politically important, has historically been an add-on to the primary aim of 
decentralization.  This has meant designers are now wrestling with the double-headed technical 
challenge of untraceability and unlinkability.  We believe that many of these currencies already 
offer features that make tracking financial payments extremely difficult.  How scrupulous those 
payments are is perhaps politically less important than what will happen to existing institutions.  
No amount of legislation is likely to prevent the growth of privacy coins in all areas of the 
economy in the next decade.  Though many privacy coin designers would have us believe that 
transactions that don’t involve us don’t affect us, this clearly is not the case.  As commerce 
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